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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals of the State of Utah has jurisdiction
ever this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (f)
(Supp. 1993).

1

QUESTIONS PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

Did the lower commit reversible error in admitting the

holster, shotgun stock, and shotgun shells seized during the Paul
residence?
In State v. Ramriez, 817 P. 2d 774, 781 n. 3 (Utah 1991) the
court stated that,
"on occasion, the legal standard for
admissibility of evidence vests a measure of
discretion in the trial court. For example,
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 requires that a
trial court balance the probiveness of a piece
of evidence against its potential for unfair
prejudice; if the potential for unfair
prejudice outweighs the probativeness, the
evidence is excluded as a matter of law. Utah
R. 403. The trial court initially performs
that balancing.
If it concludes that the
evidence is admissible, we review the decision
for correctness. But in deciding whether the
trial court errored as a matter of law, we defacto grant it some discretion, because we
reverse only if we conclude that it acted
unreasonably in striking the balance.
However, in State v. Pena, 232 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (1994) the court
recognized "the term 'abuse of discretion' has no tight meaning."
See also Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P. 2d 23, 26-27
(Utah App. 1991) (recognizing the trial judge abuses his or her
discretion where the conclusion of law is incorrect and where a
finding of fact is clearly erroneous).

In applying the law to the

facts, however, "some" discretion is given to the trial judge.
Ramirez, 817 P. 2d 781 n.3.
II.
Kelly

Whether the trial counsel's questioning of witness Steven

regarding

unproved

parole

ineffective assistance of counsel?
2

violation

allegations

was

Reviewing courts are free to make an independent determination
of the lower court's conclusions. Findings of fact must be clearlyerroneous to be set aside. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2070, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); State v.
Templon, 805 P. 2d 182, 185-6 (Utah 1990).
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STATMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the judgement and conviction for
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (Supp.
1993),

On November 31, 1993 a jury convicted Soloman Lee Ford

(Ford) of possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person,
a second degree felony.

On December 20, 1993, the court denied

Ford's motion for a new trial and sentenced him to an indeterminant
term of 1 to 15 years in the Utah State Prison. Ford appealed his
conviction to the Utah Court of Appeal by filing a notice of appeal
in the Third District Court on January 19, 1994.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the evening of August 19, 1994 Christine Gregg (Greg) and
Bruce Gunnell (Gunnell) traveled to the apartment of Gregg at 619
West: Ivy Street #4, Trial Record Day 1 at 147 (hereinafter T.R. 1
at 147).

Gregg lived in the second floor apartment of a four-plex

on Ivy street T.R, 1 at 149.

She had been away from her home for

four to five days staying at the residence of Gunnell who was a
friend.

T.R.

1 at 146-147.

Shortly after her return, the

Defendant, Soloman Lee Ford (Ford), went to her apartment to speak
to her.

T.R. 2 at 45-46.

Initially, Sharon Hawkins (Hawkins), a

neighbor of Ms. Gregg and a friend of Ford's, came into Gregg's
apartment with Ford to speak to Gregg.

T.R. 2 at 46-7. However,

she left the apartment to give Ford some time alone with his
girlfriend, Gregg.

T.R. 2 at 47.

Ford apparently was upset

because he did not want her to associate with Gunnell who had
apparently supplied her drugs in the past.

T.R. 2 at 48-9, 52.

She also had left her child for several days with a babysitter
without notice when meeting with Gunnell.

T.R. 2 at 55.

The evidence diverges at this point as to what happened.
Hawkins testified that she heard no dispute coming from the open
door of the Gregg apartment as she stood on a landing a few feet
away smoking, but that Gunnell passed by her in a nervous manner.
T.R. 2 at 56.

She also indicated that she never saw Ford in

possession of a firearm on this evening.

T.R. 2 at 47.

Gunnell, by contrast, testified that Ford walked into Gregg's
apartment cleaning the barrel of a shotgun.
5

T.R. 1 at 153, 157.

Ford walked in and out of the bedroom while cleaning the barrel.
T\R, 1 at 151-3, 157. Eventually Ford came out of the bedroom and
told Gunnell to leave.

T.R. 1 at 154.

Ford allegedly pulled a

chrome .22 caliber semi-automatic pistol on Gunnell at about this
time.

T.R. 1 at 154.

Gregg cried out for Gunnell to go and the

child that was in her arms screamed.

T.R. 1 at 155.

Gunnell

immediately drove to a local grocery store and called the police.
T.R. at 155.
Gregg initially refused to testify when called as witness at
trial.

T.R. 2 at 5.

She claimed Ford entered her apartment with

an item shaped like a barrel of a shotgun wrapped in a brown cloth
but was unsure what it was. T.R. 2 at 9.

Additionally, she

tesrified that Ford had something silver in his hand when he asked
Gunnell to leave but she also could have been imagining this. T.R.
2 at 11.
Officers Gruber (Gruber) and Vakapuna (Vakapuna) of the Salt
Lake City Police Department responded to Gunnell's call placed from
a local grocery store.

T.R. 1 at 178-9.

Gunnell related his

account of the confrontation with Ford to the officers. T.R. 1 at
179*

The officers proceeded to Gregg's apartment to check on her

welfare.

Once they determined

that

she was unharmed, they

approached two men that they had seen earlier one of which matched
the description of Ford. T.R. 1 at 184-5.

Both men were arrested

and the officers began searching for the chrome pistol or shotgun
around the neighbor and on Ford's probable path of travel. T.R. 1

6

at 186-8,

No firearms were found during this search.

T.R. 1 at

188.
Gruber later knocked on the door of the Pahl residence, an
apartment immediately opposite to Gregg's place.

T.R. 1 at 188.

They were given permission by 15 year old Cody Pahl to search the
Pahl residence. T.R. 1 at 188-9. During the course of the search,
the police found a black nylon holster on top of a china cabinet in
the living room.

T.R. 1 at 209.

They also found a red gym bay

containing yellow shotgun shells, the stock of a gun, a bandalero,
and a ski mask in Ms. Pahl's bedroom.

T.R. 1 at 189.

Gruber

testified that the "sawed-off" shotgun was inoperable and that due
to the lack of the barrel he could not tell the length of the gun.
T.R. 1 at 192.

The officers neither found a barrel or one that

matched to the shotgun stock.

T.R. 1 at 202.

Cody Pahl testified that Ford had visited the Pahl residence
previously but did not live there.

He further stated that he had

not seen Ford with the red gym bag that evening.
221.

T.R. 1 at 218-9,

Likewise, Cody had never seen Ford in possession of a

firearm.

T.R. 1 at 223.

Ford filed a pre-trial motion to suppress under rules 402 and
403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence the items seized during the
search of the Pahl residence.

T.R. 1 at 191-95. The trial court

granted the motion as to the ski mask but denied it as to the
remaining items.

T.R. 1 at 111-15.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The black holster, shotgun stock and shotgun shells were
Inadmissible under 104(b) and 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence,
No reasonable inference could be drawn from these items that Ford
possessed a firearm.

The of this evidence prejudiced Ford by

confusing the ultimate issue and misleading the jury. The evidence
vas also inadmissible under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence
because its probative value was so weak in comparison to its
prejudicial impact. The Court abused it's discretion by admitting
these of evidence resulting

in harmful error which requires

reversal of Ford's conviction.
Additionally, trial counsel's failure to refrain from opening
tie door to the admission of pending parole violations in the
Feoeral Court allowed the admission of testimony setting forth the
criminal history as well as pending allegations against Ford.
Admission of these irrelevant matters prejudiced Ford by bringing
otherwise

inadmissible

evidence.

Trial

counsel's

actions

constituted ineffective assistance.
I.

THE EVIDENCE ADMITTED AGAINST FORD OBTAINED DURING THE

SEARCH OF THE PAHL RESIDENCE IS IRRELEVANT.
Relevancy is defined by rule 401, U. R. E. as "evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence." According to
Scate v. Royball, 710 P. 2d 168 (Utah 1985), relevant evidence
assists the trier of fact in understanding the nature of the crime
8

or the manner in which the crime was committed. Evidence which can
be provided through other means such as through testimony renders
the admissions of the potentially prejudicial items minimally
relevant.

State v. Cloud, 722 P. 2d 750, 752 (Utah 1986).

The evidence which was presented in this case prejudiced the
Appellant. One witness testified at trial claiming to have seen a
weapon.

T.R. 1 at 154.

weapon.

T.R. 2 at 47.

To the contrary, Hawkins saw no such
The additional admission of the shotgun

parrs which were inoperable as a firearm, shotgun shells and the
holster which was not shown to have belonged to anyone, could only
have distracted the jury from the actual issues of the case,
wnether Ford was a restricted person who possessed a "firearm".
II.

THE ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE OF ITEMS OBTAINED DURING THE

SEARCH OF THE PAHL RESIDENCE.
Prior to trial, Ford moved for suppression of the holster,
shotgun stock, and shotgun shells based on their highly prejudicial
nature. The motion was denied by the trial judge. T.R. 1 at 112.
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states:
"although relevant, evidence may excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence."
The admission of any disputed evidence is subject to Rule
4J3's balancing test which weighs the probative value against the
prejudicial effect.

See, State v. Johnson, 784 P. 2d 1135, 1141

(Utah 1985).

9

Utah Supreme Court has categorized certain types of evidence
as having "an unusually strong propensity to unfairly prejudice a
defendant, " most recently in State v. White, slip opinion case no.
930S96-CA (1994).

Weapons were not among the category listed by

the Utah Supreme Court in that case.

Nevertheless, the admission

of the physical evidence i.e. an incomplete "weapon" or accessories
"does distort the deliberative process and improperly skew the
outcome" of the trial.
firearms

or

firearm

Id.

The jury may have believed parts of

accessories

were

equivalent

to

actual

possession of a hand gun which was never and may not have existed.
Stare v. Lafferty, 749 P. 2d 1239, 1256 (Utah 1988).
Utah courts have reversed cases under 403 when the disputed
evidence does fit into the Lafferty categories.

Such is the case

in Mauer when the entire contents of a letter written to the
victim's father by the defendant was admitted.

The court, on

appeal, ruled that parts of the letter were of such a nature that
the letter induced a decision on a purely emotional basis.
984.

Ld at

Other jurisdictions have enlarged the list of inherently

prejudicial evidence to include weapons.

In State v. Steele, 586

P. 2d 1274, 1276 (Ariz. 1978) the court ruled that the "[t]he
addition of gruesome objects such as photographs, clothing and
weapons, when introduced for no other purpose than to inflame and
arouse the passions of the jury can lead to a conviction resulting
from the jury's revulsion and not from the State's proving the
elements of the crime." (emphasis added).

The State must have

sought to admit the evidence of the holster, shotgun stock, and
10

shells because it was unable to find the weapon described by
Gunnell.

The admission

of physical

evidence was purely to

"prejudice the minds of the jury" thereby causing the jury to
believe mere presence of these parts and accessories equates to the
actual possession of a different handgun.
Shotgun:

The admission of the incomplete parts of the shotgun

mislead the jury in two ways.

First, the jury must have believed

that the shotgun stock is an operable weapon given the testimony of
Kelly and Gruber.

T.R. 1 at 143-5, 192.

At trial, the State in

opening lead the jury to believe that the parts of the shotgun
admitted as evidence could be assembled, when in fact, detective
Gruber stated later that the "shotgun" could not operate without
more parts. T.R. 1 at 123, 198-9, 202. The barrel of the shotgun
was not present.

Therefore, the shotgun was inoperable.

Second, the State mislead the jury by alleging that because
the shotgun could be assembled and rendered operable the shotgun
was therefore classified as a "weapon" under Utah Statute.
Utah

Code

Ann.

§

76-10-501

(2)(d)(Supp.

1993)

states

"'firearm' means a pistol, revolver, shotgun, sawed-off shotgun,
rifle or sawed-off rifle, or any device that could be used as a
dangerous weapon from which is expelled a projectile by any force."
The shotgun stock cannot be considered "a dangerous weapon
from which is expelled a projectile by any force".

Thus, the

State's contention was false. The admission of the partial shotgun
is consequently highly prejudicial.

The shotgun stock is not a

"weapon" as defined by statute as it was not operable in the form
11

presented

at trial.

The

"shotgun" evidence

lacked adequate

probative value to outweigh its prejudicial effect.

Given the

State's inability to produce the weapon described by Gunnell at
trial, the admission of this prejudicial and questionably relevant
evidence, created reversible error.
SHOTGUN SHELLS:
The admission of shells is prejudicial as stated in the
previous argument because the shotgun is inoperable without all the
pares and could not be classified as a weapon.
During trial testimony

from Gunnell, the shotgun shells

defendant had in his hand were red. T.R. 1 at 174.

Gruber

testified that the shells in the bag yellow. T.R. 1 at 190. Gregg
later testified that the Defendant may have had something yellow in
his hand but that what she saw could have been imagined. T.R. 2 at
10.
The inconsistent testimony regarding the color of the shells
and possible existence implies that the evidence lacks probative
value and was therefore outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
Further, possession of shotgun shells would not assist the jury in
determining whether Ford possessed a small caliber handgun.
HOLSTER:
During the search of the Paul residence a black nylon holster
was found. Gruber testified that the holster was located on top of
tne china cabinet.

T.R. 1 at 212.

Gunnell testified that Ford came into Ms. Gregg's apartment
v/hile cleaning the barrel of the shotgun and he continued by saying
12

that Ford then left and returned with the small caliber semiautomatic handgun.

T.R. 1 at 150-4.

Cody Paul testified that the Defendant was tending him while
his mother was away that evening.
red gym bag into the apartment.

Cody did not see Ford carry a

T.R. 1 at 220-222. Furthermore,

he had never seen Ford with any type of gun or firearm.

T.R. 1 at

223.
In an attempt to link the ostensible handgun to the Defendant,
the State illicited testimony from Detective Gruber that the
holster was one which holds a small handgun such as the handgun
which Gunnell said Ford possessed. Again, no such handgun was ever
found.

It must be noted that Hawkins, the neighbor, stated that

Mr. Ford did not have any such gun. T.R. 2 at 47. The purpose of
the admission of the holster as evidence was to link Ford to the
small caliber handgun.

However, no witness ever saw him in

possession of this holster, or any other for that matter.

Thus,

the holster lacked any probative value to outweigh its prejudicial
effective.

The mere presence of a holster in an apartment linked

to no one, adds nothing to the State's contention that this
Appellant possessed a handgun.
III. ADMISSION OF THE HOLSTER, SHOTGUN STOCK AND SHOTGUN
SHELLS WERE MORE PREJUDICIAL THAN PROBATIVE AND THEREFORE
CONSTITUTED HARMFUL ERROR.
The cumulative effect of the admission by the Court of these
items

was

an

abuse

of

discretion.

The

evidence

created

substantially more prejudice to the Defendant than probative value
13

i.o the prosecution.

The admission of evidence is harmful when "a

reasonable likelihood exists that absent the error, the result
would have been more favorable to the Defendant."
Dibeilo, 780 P.2d

1221, 1230

(Utah

1989).

The

State v.
"reasonable

likelihood" standard is satisfied when the Appellate Court believes
that: the "outcome [of the trial] is undermined."

See State v.

Verde, 770 P. 2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989).
"To state matters more precisely, [the court]
reviews the trial court's 403 ruling admitting
or denying admission to evidence by deciding
whether, as a matter of law, the trial court's
decision
that
"the
unfair
prejudicial
potential of the evidence outweighs [or does
not outweigh] is beyond the reasonability.
State v. Hamilton, 827 P. 2d 232, 240 (Utah
1994) quoting State v. Ramirez, 817 P. 2d 78182 n.3 (Utah 1991).
Absent the holster, shotgun stock and shells the prosecution
is left with no physical evidence and the jumbled, inconsistent
testimony of witnesses on which to base their case. Consequently,
the confidence of the outcome of the verdict must be undermined.
A reasonable likelihood exists that without the holster, shotgun
stock, and shotgun shells, the jury would not have convicted Ford.
See State v. Knight, 734 P. 2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987) ("for an error
to require reversal, the likelihood of a different outcome must be
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict").
IV.

TRIAL COUNSEL'S CROSS EXAMINATION OF MR. KELLY AMOUNTED

TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE COUNSEL
When federal probation officer Steve Kelly was under cross
examination, defense counsel asked, "Mr. Kelly, you didn't have any
other reported violations from Mr. Ford?"
14

T. 141.

On redirect

examination, the prosecutor asked Kelly, "have you filed something
1

an order to show cause or prepared a document in anticipation to

show cause?'"

T.R. 1 at 142. Defense counsel objected to the

admission of this evidence, to which the Court responded,
opened it up, Mr. Scrowcroft".

"You

T.R. 1 at 142.

Kelly then proceeded to read from a document which listed the
alleged parole violations that Ford committed:
(1)

The

commission

of

the

crime

of

aggravated

assault;
(2)

The possession of a silver handgun;

(3)

The possession of a shotgun firearm;

(4)

The assault and injury to the eye of Gregg;

(5)

The failure to report his change of residence.
T.R. 1 at 143-5.

The

United

constitutional

States

right

to

Supreme
a

fair

effective assistance of counsel.
Amend.

VI;

Strickland

v.

Court
trial

has

includes

United

Washington,

held

States
466

U.S.

that

the

right

the
to

Constitutional
668

(1984).

Strickland sets forth a two prong test for ineffective assistance
claims.

A Defendant's criminal conviction must be reversed "(1)

when counsel's performance is deficient, and (2) when counsel's
deficient performance prejudiced the defense."

Id. 693.

In the present case, trial counsel opened the door to the most
damaging testimony at trial.

The jury was made aware that a

federal agency had also decided to take action on the allegations
that were pending against Mr. Ford,
15

and they were exposed to

allegations

of

misbehavior

which

would

not

otherwise

been

inadmissible i.e. the assault on a female and changing residence
without notifying his probation officer.

The admission of this

evidence would normally be barred by Rule 404 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence because it tends to cause a jury to think that the
Defendant was a bad person and consequently acted in conformity
with bad character in regards to the charged offense.
Saunders, 699 P. 2d 738 (Utah 1985).

State v.

(Evidence of prior crimes is

presumed prejudicial and absent a reason for the admission of the
evidence other than to show Defendant acted in conformity is
inadmissible).
Additionally, trial counsel moved for and received severance
of -che charges enumerated in the information.

By his question to

Kelly, counsel then made the severance immaterial.

Adequate

preparation would

of such

inquiry.

clearly

have disclosed

the danger

In this fashion, defense counsel failed to provide

"reasonably competent" assistance.

Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 693.

Furthermore, absent trial counsel's unwise question the alleged
parole violations would not have been available to the jury. These
acts prejudiced the Defendant therefore creating a reasonable
likelihood that trial counsel's deficient performance effected the
outcome of the case. This is particularly true when no weapon was
presented at trial and the credibility of Gunnell was of paramount
importance.
V.

THE CUMULATIVE ERRORS IN ADMITTING THE SHOTGUN STOCK,

SHELLS AND HOLSTER AS WELL AS THE UNWISE QUESTIONING OF KELLY
16

REGARDING DEFENDANT'S PENDING PAROLE ALLEGATIONS PREJUDICED FORD TO
THE EXTENT THAT HE WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A FAIR
TRIAL.
The cumulative errors in admitting the shotgun stock, shotgun
shells and holster as well as the unwise questioning of Kelly
regarding Defendant's pending parole allegations prejudiced Ford to
tne extent that he was denied his constitutional right to a fair
trial.
If the individual errors of admitting the evidence and of
trial counsel's improper questioning Kelly are not adequate for
reversal, the
prejudice

cumulative

sufficient

to

effect
deny

of

Mr.

these
Ford's

constitutional rights to a fair trial.

errors
state

establishes
and

federal

Amendments VI, VIII, XIV,

Constitution of the United States; Article 1, Sec. 7, 9, and 12,
constitution of Utah State v. Ellis, 748 P. 2d 188, 191 (Utah
1987); State v. Rimmell, 721 P. 2d 498, 501-2 (Utah 1986).

CONCLUSION
Absent

the admission

of testimony

and physical

evidence

regarding items seized in the Pahl home and the unwise cross
examination of Kelly by trial counsel, Ford's conviction could not
SLand.

Therefore, this court should reverse the conviction and

lemand the case for a new trial.

17

Respectfully submitted, this ^--^pf^fday

of August 1
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Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

PART 5
WEAPONS
76-10-501. Uniform law — Definitions.
(1) (a) The individual right to keep and bear arms being a constitutionally
protected right, the Legislature finds the need to provide uniform laws
throughout the state.
(b) The provisions of this part are uniformly applicable throughout this
state and in all its political subdivisions and municipalities. No local
authority may enact or enforce any rule in conflict with the provisions of
this part.
(2) For the purpose of this part:
(a) ''Dangerous weapon" means any item that in the manner of its use
or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. In
construing whether an item, object, or thing not commonly known as a
dangerous weapon is a dangerous weapon, the character of the instrument, object, or thing; the character of the wound produced, if any; and
the manner in which the instrument, object, or thing was used are determinative.

ADDENDUM B

76-10-503. Possession of dangerous weapon — Persons
not permitted to have — Provisions for aliens —
Penalties.
(1) (a) Any person who is not either a citizen of the United States or a
lawfully admitted alien whose business, occupation, or duties require the
use of a dangerous weapon; or a lawfully admitted alien who has obtained
a special hunting permit from the Department of Public Safety; or any
person who has been convicted of any crime of violence under the lews of
the United States, the state, or any other state, government, or country,
or who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug, or any person who has
been declared mentally incompetent may not own or have in his possession or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined in
this part. The Department of Public Safety shall adopt rules governing
the issuance and use of special hunting permits for lawfully admitted
aliens.
(b) Any person who violates this section is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and if the dangerous weapon is a firearm or sawed-off shotgun,
he is guilty of a third degree felony.
(2) (a) Any person who is on parole for a felony or is incarcerated at the
Utah state prison or other like facility may not have in his possession or
under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined in this
part.
(b) Any person who violates this section is guilty of a third degree
felony, and if the dangerous weapon is a firearm, explosive or infernal
machine, he is guilty of a second degree felony.

ADDENDUM C

1

parties and counsel are present.

2

in the courtroom at this time.

3

MR. SCOWCROFT:

The jury is not present

Mr. Scowcroft.

Thank you, Your Honor.

I have

4

filed three Motions in Limine and I would like the Court

5

to rule on them at this time.

6

The first motion I would like to address is the

7

Motion in Limine to Suppress Evidence.

I have attached

8

some case law to that and a statute.

9

Your Honor, is to exclude under authority of Rules 402

And the motion,

10

and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, the evidence

11

seized from De Sol Pahl's apartment.

12

surrounding that seizure were presented to this Court

13

during our Motion to Suppress this evidence on Fourth

14

Amendment grounds which this Court denied.

15

under Rule 402 and 403 is a separate basis to exclude

16

this evidence.

The facts

Suppression

17

The evidence, as stated in my motion, includes

18

red gym bag, parts of the shotgun, the shotgun shells, a

19

ski mask and a holster.

20

relevant to the charge; to the events that occurred on

21

August 19th of 1993.

22

Ford possessed a small chrome handgun.

23

This evidence is probably not

It is alleged by the State that Mr.

First of all, in terms of the shotgun, there

24

has not been any testimony that the shotgun was

25

brandished or displayed by Mr. Ford on August 19th.
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1

There was some testimony, I think the State wants to

2

introduce testimony, that maybe a week earlier, Mrs.

3

Gregg and perhaps Mr. Gunnell saw Mr. Ford in possession

4

of parts of it or something like that of a shotgun.

5

No. 2, the parts of the shotgun that were

6

admitted as evidence in the Motion to Suppress earlier,

7

do not constitute a firearm because they cannot function

8

as a gun.

9

firearm is def ined under 76—10—501 subsection D, which I

They cannot shoot a projectile.

And that is,

10

have included with the motion.

11

items, No. 1, are not relevant to the charge in the

12

Information.

13

firearm on August 19th, firearm being a small revolver,

14

that has never been recovered.

15

For that reason, these

Again, which is that Mr. Ford possessed a

Now my argument is basically the same for all

16

of these items.

Let me explain.

I believe that the

17

items further are the probative value of these items are

18

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

19

prejudice, confusion of the issues and misleading the

20

jury.

21

may even be relevant to these charges, to the charge

22

before the Court today.

23

that the holster is relevant evidence because it is

24

alleged that Mr. Ford possessed a handgun that was not

25

found.

That is Rule 403 and that goes to evidence that

I know that the State will argue

92

In terms of that piece of evidence, the holster
was never seen in Mr. Ford's possession because the
handgun was never found.

It is mere speculation that the

holster has anything to do with an alleged handgun, and
for that reason I think it is unduly prejudice under
these conditions.
The other items of evidence, I think are
clearly irrelevant and further are highly prejudicial and
misleading for the reasons I have stated: that they don't
go to the charge here, they are prior.

Well, I will get

to that in my next motion.
I have attached a couple of cases here, Your
Honor:

State vs. De Alio and State vs. Maurer.

De Alio,

as you know, involves a trial for a drug charge, evidence
taken from the defendant's apartment, was admitted at
trial that went to prior bad acts.

That is, it was a

ledger book apparently, a search warrant going to some
other unrelated bad act.

So I think the facts of that

case are in that way similar to the facts of this case in
that the State would admit evidence going to a prior bad
act, an act that the State alleges occurred about a week
earlier.

So I think admission of this evidence would be

reversible error under these circumstances.
I included Maurer simply because it contains a
discussion of Rule 403.

And I think what the Court needs
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1

to look at is basically what the Court has is a balancing

2

of probative value and prejudice, and I think as I have

3

stated, the evidence here is not relevant to the charge.

4

If it is relevant, it is highly prejudicial and should be

5

excluded for those reasons.

6

I have also filed a Motion in Limine under Rule

7

403 and 404 (b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence to suppress

8

evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts.

9

course, what this goes to is again these alleged,

And, of

10

uncharged conduct that occurred maybe a week earlier or

11

so.

12

relevant.

It is misleading.

It is prejudicial and it is not

13

I have also filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence

14

of prior criminal history of Mr. Ford under Rules 403 and

15

609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

16

concern here, Your Honor, is that, if I could approach,

17

this is a copy of a Judgment and Probate Commitment Order

18

that I believe the State will try to admit into evidence.

19

I understand that an element of this offense is the fact

20

that Mr. Ford is on parole or probation.

21

said that it will call Steve Kelly, a probation officer,

22

to testify that Mr. Ford is on parole.

23

there does not say he is on parole.

24

he has been convicted for armed bank robbery and I would

25

ask the Court to exclude any reference to the conviction

I think that my

The State has

That document

All it says is that
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1

for armed bank robbery.

2

charge.

3

basis for that motion.

It is unnecessary to prove the

It is highly prejudicial and so that is the

4

So really what we have here, we want to

5

suppress any alleged prior bad acts that did not occur on

6

the date of the crime charged here.

7

fact that he has allegedly been convicted for bank

8

robbery ought to be admitted because it is prejudicial

9

and it is irrelevant.

What is relevant is whether or not

10

he is on probation or parole.

11

THE COURT:

12
13
14

a felony?

We do not think the

Isn't it on probation or parole for

It doesn't say that?
MR. SC0WCR0FT:

No, it doesn't say that.

It

may be a lesser included offense, however, to have been -

15
16

THE COURT:

As charged is a second, though?

17

MR. SC0WCR0FT:

18

THE COURT:

Right.

A felony is an essential element of

19

the offense, it seems to me.

20

Scowcroft?

21

MR. SCOWCROFT:

You disagree with that, Mr.

Yeah, it does need to be for a

22

felony, that is true.

23

it says any person who has been convicted of any crime of

24

violence under the laws of the United States.

25

MR. MORGAN:

And also, under 76-10-503, sub 1,

That applies to the other
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